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I  ------  ---I. Introduction
'The literature suggests that roughly half of cross-country  differences in per capita
income  and  growth  are  driven  by  differences  in  Total  Factor  Productivity,  generally
associated  with  technological  progress.2 This  fact  moves  to  center  stage  an  abiding
question  in economic  development:  why  do  developing  countries,  with  great  potential
gains from adopting technologies from the industrialized countries, fail to do so?  In fact,
perversely,  the countries generating  new technologies  at the frontier appear to have faster
TFP  growth  in  manufacturing  and  agriculture  than  the  poor  countries  who  could,  in
theory,  simply adopt.3
However,  recent  work in innovation  stresses  that adopting existing technology  is
not  without  cost.  Firms  and  countries  need  to develop  an  "absorptive"  or  "national
learning"  capacity  which,  in  turn  are  hypothesized  to  be  functions  of  spending  on
research  and  development  (R&D).4 Though  often  considered  relevant  only  for  basic
science,  Cohen and  Levinthal  (1991)  among others  stress  learning --  knowing where  the
frontier  is  and  figuring  out what  adaptations  are  necessary  --  as the  "second face"  of
R&D.  In fact, Pavitt (2001)  argues that investment in pure research is also important for
developing  countries.  First,  those  most familiar with the  frontiers  of basic  science will
best train  the applied problem solvers in the private  sector.  Second,  even basic research
does  not  flow easily  or costlessly  across  borders  so  developing countries  cannot simply
rely on what is being generated in the advanced countries.
This  paper investigates  three outstanding  issues that are central  to understanding
the links between  innovation and development.  We first generate stylized patterns  of the
evolution  of R&D spending over the course of development employing a new panel data
set- constructed  by  Lederman  and  Saenz  (2003).  The  evidence  shows  that  R&D  rises
exponentially with the level of development measured by GDP per capita.  Provocatively,
we also identify several striking outliers such as Taiwan and Korea in East Asia,  Finland
2 See Hall and Jones (1999), Dollar and Wolf (1997).
3 Martin and Mitra (2001)
4At the firm level, see Cohen and Levinthal  (1990), Forbes and Wield (2000), Griffith, Redding and Van
Reenen (2003), Pavitt (2001) at the national  level see,  for example,  Baumol, Nelson and Wolf (1994).
2and  Israel  among  the  industrialized  countries,  and  even  poor  China  and  India  that
experienced a "take  off' that dramatically diverges  from the median trajectory  observed
in the global data.
Second, we ask whether the success of several of these countries was due partly to
their  deviation  from  the  standard  path,  suggesting  that  developing  countries  need  to
greatly upgrade their R&D efforts, or were these innovation "over-achievers"  engaged in
wasteful  spending?  To  approach  these  questions  we  follow  an emerging  literature  that
estimates the social rates of return  to R & D. Virtually  all studies have used U.S. industry
and firm  level  data and found  extremely  high  social  rates  of return  ranging  from  71%
(Griliches and Lichtenberg  1984) to over 100%  (Terleckyj  1980 and Scherer 1982).  Only
three  studies  to date use cross country  data, thereby  presumably  capturing  intra-country
spillovers.  Coe and Helpman  (1995) estimate rates of return to R&D of 123%  for the G7
and  85%  for  the  remaining  15  OECD  countries;  van  Pottelsberghe  de  la  Potterie  and
Lichtenberg (2001)  find returns of 68%  in the G7 and  15%  for a subset of the remaining
OECD countries.  At the long run US cost of capital of 7%, these estimates imply that the
optimal levels of R&D should be multiples of their present levels.
To  date,  the  literature  relative  to  developing  countries  is  extremely  thin.
Lichtenberg (1994)  works with a cross section of 53  countries and argues that the return
to  private  R&D  is  seven  times  larger  than  to  fixed  investment.  Coe,  Helpman  and
Hoffmaister  (1997)  and  a  sub-sequent  literature  (Keller  2001)  estimate  the impact  of
foreign R&D on manufacturing TFP growth in developing countries.  These authors argue
that  because  developing  countries'  own  R&D  expenditures  are  so  low,  they  can  be
ignored.  The  data  employed  here  suggest  that  developing-country  R&D  is  not
necessarily insignificant relative to the size of their economies, and more importantly, the
returns  are  substantial.  In  fact,  the  returns  to  R&D  in developing  countries  are  above
those for industrialized countries.
Our estimation  strategy attempts to deal with several  issues raised in the existing
literature,  particularly  those  employing  single  cross  sections,  related  to  unobserved
country heterogeneity  and the likely endogeneity  of R&D.  For instance,  Barro and Sala-
3I-Martin  (1995, 352) find the reported rates of return  to be implausibly high and speculate
that  they  are  due  to  reverse  causality  going  from  productivity  growth  to  R&D
expenditures.
A  third  question  naturally  emerges  from  the  aforementioned  analyses:  If  the
returns  are  so high in poor  countries,  why do  rich countries  invest  more  in  R&D  as  a
share of GDP? To answer this question we explore potential determinants  of R&D across
countries  and over time. We  find that the depth of domestic  credit  markets,  educational
variables, the extent of protection offered to intellectual property rights (IPRs), the ability
to  mobilize  government  resources,  and  the  quality  of  complementary  academic
institutions  influence  cross-country  differences  in R&D,  and a  subset of these  variables
together  completely  eliminate  the  apparent effect  of the level  of development  on  R&D
effort.
A  recurring  question  throughout  the  paper  is  whether  and  how  much  of the
patterns  observed  across  countries  can  be  explained  by  their  endowments  of natural
resources.  Numerous  authors  (see for  instance,  Sachs  and  Warner  2001,  Matusyama
1991)  argue  that the  prospects  for productivity  growth  are  intrinsically  lower  in these
sectors  than in manufacturing.  Lower potential for TFP growth could imply lower rates
of rates of return  to R&D and hence  lower investment.
The  rest of  the  paper  is organized  as  follows.  Section  11 focuses  on innovation
trajectories during the development process by discussing the data and the corresponding
results.  Section Im discusses  basic  concepts  and  methods  used for estimating  the  social
rates of return  to R&D.  Section  IV  then explores  the determinants  of R&D.  Section  V
summarizes  the main findings.
II.  Innovation Trajectories:  R&D Expenditures and Development
The data were drawn from a data base constructed  by Lederman  and Saenz  (2003)
for a broad cross section of countries from the  1960s to the present.  Further de'ail on the
construction  of the  series is  available  there  but the  core data on R&D  was  drawn  from
4UNESCO,  The  World  Bank,  OECD,  the  Ibero  American  Science  and  Technology
Indicators  Network  (RICYT)5 and  the Taiwan  Statistical Data Book.  The definition  of
R&D in all these  surveys is the same and "includes fundamental  and applied research, as
well  as  experimental  development."  6  The  data thus include not only the basic  science
expected  in  the  more  advanced  countries,  but  also  investments  in  the  adoption  and
adaptation of existing technologies often thought more germane to developing countries.
Though  it  would  be  desirable  to  study  the  evolution,  rate  of  return  to,  and
determinants  of private R&D,  we work  with  aggregate  R&D for  several reasons.  First,
the  data sources  divide  R&D  not  into  private  and  public  R&D,  rather  they distinguish
between productive  and non-productive  sectors, the latter accounting for roughly  20% of
the  total.7 The  definition  of "productive  sector"  includes  both  public  and  private  for
profit  and not-for profit firms  while  "non-productive  sector"  includes  R&D  financed or
undertaken by the executive  branch of government.  Since the productive sector may well
include  mining, public utilities or other state owned enterprises,  the exercise of analyzing
how its R&D evolves  and its rate of return relative to that of non-productive  sector is less
interesting  than the public/private  sector split.
Second,  this  division  seems  to  occasionally  lead  to  some  critical  issues  in
categorization.  For  instance,  if a  public  company  finances  its  R&D  from  retained
earnings, this will count as productive  sector R&D.  If instead that R&D is financed by a
transfer  from the treasury  to the  firm, it counts  as "non-productive"  R&D.  For several
countries  in our  sample,  there were  striking  shifts  in composition  from one  year to  the
next suggesting such sensitivity to accounting practices.  In contrast, the total R&D series
were  reasonably  stable.  The  final  consideration  is  more  prosaic:  many  developing
countries  tabulate  only the  aggregate  values  and as  they are  the focus  of this paper,  we
want to include as many as possible.
5 Red Iberoamericana  de Indicadores  de Ciencia y Tecnologfa
6 UNESCO Statistical  Yearbook  (1980) pg 742. Definitions are common to the OECD, RICYT, World
Bank and all are based  on the Frascatti  manual  definition.
7 The median for countries with both series is  21%.
5Figure la plots  the predicted and observed  levels of R&D  as a share of  GDP as
function of the log GDP per capita. The predicted value  is generated from a regression of
the  log of the  ratio  of total  R&D expenditures  to  GDP on log  GDP per  capita and its
squared term.  Due to concerns  about the influence of outliers, this model  was estimated
as a median  regression.  The estimated coefficients  are presented  in the first column of
Table  1, and Figure  la illustrates  the resulting positive relationship  between R&D effort
and log GDP per capita.  It is clear from this evidence that R&D expenditures/GDP  rise
with  development  and that the rate of increase  also rises with  GDP per capita.  Though
the apparent  curvature  is partly  a function  of the  log transformation  of GDP per capita
employed  to more  clearly  display  the  differences  among  poor countries,  the elasticities
estimated  in Table  1 eventually  exceed unity  suggesting  that  the second derivative is, in
fact  increasing.  The  fixed  effects  estimates  in  column  2  indicate  that  the  non-linear
positive relationship  between  R&D  and the level of development  is a phenomenon  that
occurs within countries, and it is not an exclusive feature of the cross-country variations.
Figure lb presents a first cut at looking at how a few select countries from several
regions  compare  to  the  predicted  value.  What  is  immediately  striking  is  that  Korea,
Finland,  and Israel  show  substantial  "take offs"  relative to the median  trajectory.  Two
Latin American countries, Argentina and Mexico, which had  similar levels of income as
Korea  and Israel  prior to their take  off hover  on  or below  the  predicted  value for their
level of development.  Both China and India appear  to be following more in the footsteps
of the "take off" countries than the Latin Americans.
Figures 2a-d  present  the residuals  from a more general  and flexible specification
that includes  log GDP,  log  GDP  squared,  log labor  force,  and  log labor force  squared,
and year  dummies  as  explanatory  variables.  This  allows for independent  effects  related
to the size of the economy  and  size of the labor force  rather than per capita income  or
development per  se. In  this case,  the  predicted  value is captured  by the horizontal  axis
and  we  observe  the evolution  of country  R&D effort  across  time  as  opposed  to  across
income levels.  The selection  of countries  reflects the  availability of data in the case of
the  developing  countries  and  an  attempt  to present  a  broad  cross  section  of types  of
countries.  For the developing world,  we focus on Latin America and Asia.  Africa's data
6is of generally poor quality and  the  time series  from  the emerging Eastern  European  are
still relatively short.
The  results  broadly  support  the  conclusions  from  figures  1.  Both  Korea  and
Taiwan  show  impressive  rises  to roughly  100 percent  above median  levels in the early
1980s  that continue to this day.  Both India's and China's  residuals suggest long standing
above  median  investment  that  seems  to  have  declined  somewhat  in  the  1990s.  This
appears due not so much to a decline in the absolute amount of R&D spending, but rather
some  lag  in  keeping  up  with  the  relatively  high  growth  rates  of this  period.  This
highlights,  in  particular,  the  achievements  of  Korea  and  Taiwan  in  maintaining  an
increasing  level  of R&D  in periods  where GDP  was growing  at rates close  to  10%  per
year.  The  two  little  tigers,  Thailand  and  Indonesia,  show  very  different  trajectories
suggesting  that they are,  in fact, not following closely  in the footsteps of the  successful
Asian economies in the innovation dimension.  The decline starts long before the crisis of
the late  1990s  and most of the trend is due more to a stagnation of R&D spending in the
face of rising GDP than absolute  falls.
The new benchmarking presents a more pessimistic view of the evolution of Latin
America's  R&D effort.  Argentina and Chile are only very  rarely above  the median with
Chile the most consistent performer near the median.  In the cases of Argentina,  and to a
lesser  extent,  Venezuela  and  Chile,  R&D  effort  has  declined  secularly  relative  to  the
median.  The  rest  of the  region  has  muddled  along  at roughly  50% of the median  for
much  of  the  period,  although  Latin  American  countries  seem to  have  approached  the
conditional median  in the late  1990s.  Given  the sharp falls in incomes  in most of these
countries  during  the  lost decade  of the  1980s,  the  stagnation  or  decline relative  to the
median represents  absolute declines in total innovation effort.
Two questions  immediately  come  to mind.  The  first  is whether the  low R&D
spending  is  to  some  degree  a  result  of  specialization  in  natural  resource  intensive
products.  It is striking that Indonesia and Thailand  as well as Latin America  are natural
resource  abundant  countries  as  reflected  in  high  net  exports  of  resource  intensive
commodities as defined  in Leamer (1984).  However, Figures 2c casts some doubts about
7such a link between R&D and natural resources.  While  the overall goal is to present the
trajectories  of  more  advanced  countries,  we  divide  the  sample  into  those  advanced
countries  that are ranked as abundant  in factors used intensively in manufactured exports
(2c)  and  those  abundant  in  natural  resources  (2d).  What  is  striking  is  that  Finland,
Sweden  and the Netherlands,  all resource abundant  are consistent  over performers  while
Canada,  Australia  and  Ireland  are  pretty  consistently  at  the  median.  In,  fact,  Trefler
(1999)  argues  that  Canada's  very  average  performance  is  partially  responsible  for
Canada's lack luster performance  relative  to the U.S.
The  more  manufacturing  oriented  countries,  also  show  a  very  diverse  picture.
Israel and Switzerland  have  shown consistently above median performance  with Israel's
trajectory  since  1975  especially  striking  (see Trajtenberg  2001  for a discussion).  Japan
and the U.S. pretty much defined the trend although they slipped below the median in the
1990s.  It  is worth  mentioning that at higher levels  of income the sample becomes very
thin  so  the  benchmarking  becomes  somewhat  less  informative.  The U.S.  and  Japan
invest  very  high  shares  of GDP in  R&D  but Switzerland  invests  more  so the  first  two
appear  "below  median."  Spain  has  slowly emerged  to join Italy  at more  or less  Latin
American  levels of underperformance.
These  findings  naturally  lead  to  the  second  question  of whether  the unusually
high levels of R&D in some countries, and particularly the dramatic takeoffs of Finland,
Israel,  Korea,  and  Taiwan  were  justifiable  investments  or  whether  in  some  sense  they
may  reflect  a  new  type  of  technological  white  elephant.  All  are  very  successful
countries,  but to what  degree  do they owe  this  to  their efforts  in R&D?  To  answer  this
question  we  turn  to  an  analysis  of  the  social  rates  of return  to  R&D  in  the  following
section.
81[l11.  Rates of Return to R&D Expenditures
A.  The standardframework
A simple production function  (see Jones and Williams  1998)
Y = KA LA6 S6
where  Y is the level of output, K the level of physical capital,  L the labor stock and S the
stock of accumulated R&D, can be rewritten as
AlnY = rk(I)+rS(-)+AAIlnL
y  y
by using the fact that
8ixAln(X)= rx(  )= r(x).
Here rx is the rate of return on factor X, x is the share of investment in X over Y, and /3x
is the output elasticity of factor X  . If we remove the influence of physical factors to get
TFP then the social rate of return  to R & D is
r, = AlnTFP/s
where  s is  the share of R&D spending in income. The optimal level of R&D expenditure
occurs  where  rs=  r,  the  real  interest  rate.  So,  the  ratio  of the  optimal  level  of R&D
investment  to actual  along  a balanced  growth  path  can be  expressed  as  the ratio of the
social rate of return to R&D over the real interest rate or opportunity cost:
9s  r
s  r
Jones and Williams argue  that for a very conservative  estimate of 28% return to R&D in
the US,  a long run 7%  rate of return on the  stock  market over the last century  suggests
that the U.S. should be investing perhaps 4 times the present R&D level observed in this
country, which averaged approximately 2.6% of GDP during 1995-2000.
B. Estimation of the rates of return
We begin with a basic specification that can nest much of the existing work on the
empirics of economic growth:
y,,  = ylny,1,_,+/?'X 1 +xS,,  +,+u,  +,u, +eF,  (1)
Where  yi, dot is the log difference  of per capita GDP of country  i in period t, y,,tl  is log
income per capita  at the beginning of the period,  X the matrix of conditioning  variables,
in this case the growth of labor,  s,t represents investments in both physical and innovative
capital  expressed  as  a share of income.  pi  is an  individual  country fixed  effect,  Rt is  a
sample-wide time effect, and Eit is a country and time specific effect.
One important  type of omitted variable  bias might be  induced by the correlation
of unobserved  country-specific  factors  and  the  variables  of  interest;  E(I.,,  s,t)  may  be
large.  Casselli, Esquivel  and Lefort  (1996), for instance,  pointed out that the difference
with  respect  to the  highest  level  of income in  the  sample of countries  (i.e.,  the level  to
which she other countries are converging)  acts as a proxy of the country-specific  effect in
cross sectional regressions,  and thus the resulting estimates  are inconsistent.
Panel  data  offers  the  only  real  solution  to  the endogeneity  problem  through  the
use of lagged values  as  instruments  for endogenous  variables.  The issue  of unobserved
country  specific  effects  can  also  be  addressed  although  the  standard  fixed  or  variable
10effects  estimators  are  not  consistent  in  the  present  context  that  implicitly  includes  a
lagged dependent variable  -- the initial level of GDP per capita.  The assumption of a lack
of correlation  between  ,4  and  the  explanatory  variables  required  for  variable  effects
estimators  is not defensible in this context  since both  yt dot and Yt-i  are a function of ji,.
On the other hand,  OLS is clearly inconsistent and FGLS is also if the errors show either
heteroskedasticity  or  serial correlation  (Sevestre  and  Trognon  1996). Further,  the  usual
elimination of  i, by subtracting  the country mean induces a negative correlation between
the transformed  error and  the lagged  dependent  variables  of order  1/T,  which,  in  short
panels  such  as  those  used  here  remains  substantial.  If  at  least  one  of the  explanatory
variables  is truly exogenous, Balestra and Nerlove  (1996)  show that its lags can be used
as  instruments  and  will  yield  consistent  estimates.  However,  in  the  present  case,  it  is
difficult to assume that any of our variables are strictly exogenous.
Following  Anderson  and Hsiao (1982),  Arellano and Bond  (1991) and Caselli et.
al.  (1996)  in the  growth  literature,  we  therefore  difference  the data  to eliminate  i, thus
yielding:
A,, =  Iny,,,  +/J'AX,,, +cAs,,  + Afl  +  (2)
Any  unobserved  country  fixed  effects  disappear  in  the  differenced  errors.  However,
unless the idiosyncratic  error followed a random walk, this differencing necessarily gives
the  transformed  error  a  moving-average,  MA(n),  structure  that  is  correlated  with  the
differenced  lagged dependent  variable.  This can be overcome by using instruments  dated
t-n  and  earlier.  Arellano  and  Bond  (1991)  employ  lagged  levels  as  a  proxy  for
differences  in  a Generalized  Method of Moments  (GMM)  context.  However,  in growth
regressions  where  the  explanatory  variables  (e.g.  schooling,  natural  resource
endowments)  show  little  variation over time,  levels  are often poor instruments.  For this
reason,  Levine,  Loayza,  and Beck (2000) in their examination. of the impact of financial
variables  on growth  follow Blundell and Bond (1998) and Arellano and Bover (1995)  in
employing  a system  estimator  that rescues  some of the cross-sectional  variance  that is
lost  in  the  differences  GMM  estimator  by  estimating  a  system  of  equations  that  also
11includes  equation  (1)  in  levels,  but  with  the  lagged  differences  of  the  endogenous
variables  as instruments.  Bond  et  al.  (2001)  show that  the  "weak  instruments"  problem
can  be severe  in cross-country  growth regressions  with panel  data.  Therefore we  follow
them,  as  well  as  Levine  et  al.  (2000)  in  applying  the  GMM  system  estimator  to  our
growth models.
We follow Griliches  (1995)  in estimating the growth regression as in equation (2),
rather than  estimating  the TFP residual  first and then using that residual as  the dependent
variable of R&D. The single regression  approach  is superior in this case, because  we are
interested  in  the  returns  to R&D investment relative  to physical  capital  investments  and
thus we want to retrieve mutually consistent  estimates of the returns for both variables.
C. Results
The core data combines  the  R&D data  with  that of Summers and  Heston (1991)
panel  updated to 2000 and the Leamer measure of resource endowments.  We estimate the
corresponding  growth  regressions  using panel  data of five-year averages  between  1975-
2000.  Table  2  presents  estimated  returns  to R&D  for  the panel  of countries  that  had
sufficient  consecutive  observations  (at  least  three)  required  for  the  GMM  system
estimator.  All the regressions  pass the Sargan  test for the validity of the instruments and
there  is  no  evidence  that  they  suffer  from  residual  second  order  serial  correlation.8
Column  1 indicates  that,  for the largest  possible  sample,  returns to R&D as a whole are
around 78%.  This  estimate falls in the middle of those previously  cited estimates for the
U.S.  and the OECD estimates from Coe and Helpman  (1995).
To  see  if  this  aggregate  number  is  hiding  variation  across  different  levels  of
development  either across  countries  or within  countries,  we  interact  the  R&D term  and
the physical investment term with per capita GDP.  The negative R&D interaction term in
column 2 suggests a decreasing  return to R&D with development.  This is consistent with
the  intuition  of  numerous  conditional  convergence  regressions  in  the  Barro  (1991)
8 The null of the Sargan test is that there is no correlation  between the errors and the instruments.  Thus a
high p-value indicates that the Instruments are not correlated  with the errors.
12tradition:  It is likely that a dollar's worth of R&D buys greater increases  in productivity
for countries  far from the technological  frontier than for innovating  countries  who must
invent the new technologies  that push the frontier forward.  Figure 3 plots the predicted
values of both R&D and physical investment. The return in the average OECD country is
somewhere  between  20-40%.  For medium  income  levels,  such  as Mexico  and-Chile,  the
average  return  is around  60%  and for  relatively  poor countries,  such  as  Nicaragua,  the
average return is closer to  100%.
Figure  3 also  plots  the  estimated  return  to  physical  capital,  which  column  2 also
suggests  is  decreasing  in  level  of development.  As  a first  conservative  approximation,
we  treat  this as  the cost of investment resources  and hence  the ratio of the two  returns
gives  us the ratio of optimal R&D investment  to actual.  For the U.S.,  the gap of 2.25 is
somewhat  more moderate than that offered  by Jones and Williams  (1998).  The return to
R&D rises  for poorer countries,  but given  that return  to physical  capital  also rises,  their
ratio  also  remains  under  2.5.  Since  the  high  rate  of return  to  physical  investment  in
developing  countries  may  reflect  the  risk  or  other  factors  that  would  drive  a  wedge
between  it  and  the  true  cost  of  borrowing,  this  calculation  may  be  excessively
conservative.  If  instead,  we  go  to  the  other  extreme  of  assuming  free  access  to
international capital markets and that the opportunity cost of capital  is the 20th century's
return on the U.S.  stock  market of roughly 7%, as suggested  by Jones  and  Williams,  the
gap for countries of Mexico's or Chile's  development  level  would rise closer to 8.  This
would suggest  that the deviations  from the central tendency exhibited by Israel, Finland,
Korea and Taiwan were fully justifiable by the rates of return to R&D.
The remaining  columns of Table  2  introduce  other  variables  that may  explain  the
returns,  but  whose  availability  reduces  the  sample  by  10  countries  and,  for  several
countries,  the  observations  available  for  use  as  instruments  from  the  1960s  thus
shortening the overall period of estimation  as well.  Column 3 repeats the specification in
column  1 with the reduced sample,  and we immediately see that the returns to R&D have
13now  risen  to  133%  and those  of physical  capital  to  18.9%.9  The dramatic  rise of the
former  is  likely  to  be  an  artifact  of  the  countries  that  were  dropped,  which  include
Colombia,  Guatemala,  Iran, Jamaica,  Jordan,  Malta,  Mauritius,  Togo and Zambia, which
could be  under-performers  relative to the average returns to R&D  among poor countries.
Nonetheless,  the  returns  are  clearly  sensitive  to the  sample  of countries  and  thus  the
results should be interpreted  with some caution.
Column  4  adds  both  the  tertiary  education  enrollment  rate  as  a  possible  fourth
production  factor  and  the  Leamer  net  exports  of  natural-resource  intensive  exports  to
control  for  postulated  impacts  of  natural  resources  on  growth  through  the  investment,
education,  or R&D  channels.  Higher  education  does  appear  to  have  a positive  rate  of
return  and  natural  resource  abundance  appears  positively  correlated  with  growth,
consistent with Lederman  and Maloney (2003).  The coefficients  on the other factors do
not  change  dramatically  as  a  result  although  the  return  to  R&D  now  falls  to  102%.
Columns  5 and  6 interact the physical  capital  and R&D investment terms  with GDP per
capita and,  in addition,  the R&D  and resource  abundance terms to  see whether  resource
abundance  in fact hampers innovation based growth.
Column  7  confirms  the  declining  returns  to  R&D  and  physical  capital  with
development.  It also suggests  that  R&D and natural resources  are strong complements;
the  returns to R&D rise with natural  resource exports  and vice-versa.  This is consistent
with  Martin  and  Mitra's  (2001)  finding  that agriculture  has experienced  a much  faster
rate of TFP growth than manufacturing  in most developed  and developing countries.  It is
also  consistent  with  the  argument  that  the  better  performance  of,  for  instance,
Scandanavia  or  Australia -in their  exploitation  of natural  resources  compared  to  Latin
America can be explained by their much higher R&D effort and other innovation-related
policies  (Maloney 2002).  Since the  Sargan tests rejects  the  adequacy  of the instrument
set,  column  6  represents  is  the  most  complete  well  specified  regression  achievable,
although it drops the physical capital interactive term.  The previous results hold.
9  In fact, putting  in education  alone decreases the sample by 5 countries but somewhat counterintuitively
pushes the return to R&D to 98%.  This is likely to be due to the same selection issue discussed  below.
14The previous  findings  that poor countries  invest  less  in  R&D  than  rich  countries
and that the returns  to R&D  are  higher in poor countries  beg the question of why  poor
countries invest less in R&D. The following section addresses this question.
IV.  Determinants  of  R&D:  Why  Do  Rich  Countries  Spend  More  than  Poor
Countries?
A. Related literature  and data
There  are  very  few  studies  of the  determinants  of R&D  across  countries.  Two
such studies  (Varsakelis  2001;  Bebczuk 2002)  suffer from small  samples and,  as result,
inconsistent  estimates  due  to  inability  to  deal  with  country-specific  effects  and
endogeneity  of  the  explanatory  variables.  Here  we  again  apply  the  GMM  system
estimator to our larger sample.
We begin  by analogy  to the investment  literature  (see Serven 2003, for example)
assuming equilibrium  where the marginal  product equals  the cost of borrowing,  but then
ask what  factors  may  impede  this equalization  and  hence  explain  why,  given  the  high
estimated rates of return,  we do not observe  more R&D investment.
We  first  include  a proxy for  the  long  term  real  cost of borrowing.  As  a  first
approximation,  we  employ  the  nominal  30-90  day  lending  rate  deflated  by  the  CPI.
Though  this  has  the  most  international  coverage  in  the  IMF International Financial
Statistics, it  is  still  not complete.  Further  we eliminate  countries  showing  negative  real
interest  rates or values above 40%  which  we assume  are  unsustainable  long run levels,
and  capturing  stabilization  problems,  as  was  the  case  in Argentina  and  Brazil  in  the
1980s.  Together,  these  imply a reduction  in  the  sample  to 30  countries.  As  a second
alternative  we include  the actual  gross  fixed investment  rate which  we presume  reflects
the  opportunity  cost of investment  as  well  as  other factors  pertaining  to  the  investment
climate.  A  disadvantage  is  that  the  impact  of  other  variables  determining  R&D
investment  must  be  interpreted  as  effects  beyond  what  they  may  have  on  physical
15investment.  Finally,  we follow  David  et  al.  (2000)  arguments  in  including  a measure  of
credit  market depth measured as the ratio of credit to the private sector relative to GDP to
proxy for the availability of credit at the reported  interest rate.
A  second  set  of  variables  seeks  to  capture  risk  associated  with  long  term
investments.  Following  Serven (2003) we  include the variance of GDP which he found
correlated with physical investment.
We  also  include  a  measure  of intellectual  property  rights  that  would  also affect
the  expected  quasi  rents  derived  from  innovation.  Although  the  impact  of  IPR  is
theoretically  ambiguous  (Horstmann  et.  al  1985),  Arora,  Ceccagnoli  and  Cohen  (2003)
using US  manufacturing  survey  data find that patent  protection  stimulates  R&D across
almost all industries.  For this purpose we use the IPR index constructed by Park (2002).
To control for the fact that we are using a series of total R&D expenditures,  which
includes  private  and  public  financing  of  R&D,  we  include  a  measure  of  overall
government  spending  over GDP as  a measure  of the government's  capacity  to mobilize
resources.
As  possible  further  constraints  on  investment,  we  include  measures  of  the
availability  of complementary  innovation-related  institutions  that may  also  put binding
constraints  on new  R&D  projects.  We include  the subjective  indicators  from the Global
Competitiveness Report (GCR)  published  by the  World  Economic Forum on  the quality
of research  institutions (universities,  public research  centers, etc)  and the extent to which
these  collaborate  effectively  with  the  private  sector.  These  considerations  may  also
constrain  the number of national innovation  projects. Due to the limited time coverage  of
these two variables,  we use the average of the available  observations  from the late  1990s
and assume that these change little over time.
Finally,  we  include  the Learner  indicator  of natural  resource  abundance  to see if
there  is  evidence  of special  barriers  to R&D  investment  in  natural  resource  abundant
countries  that may somehow  explain the especially high rates of return found there.
16In all specifications  we include as control variables the lagged dependent variable,
GDP  growth to capture cyclical  or accelerator  effects,  and  the log of GDP/capita  which
we know from section II is positively  associated with the R&D effort.  Finding correlates
that eliminate this last effect and explain why richer countries invest more is a key goal of
the exercise.
B. Results
Tables  3a presents  the  results  using  the  real  interest  rate  and  reduced  sample.
Table  3b  presents  those  with  the  fixed  investment  proxy.  Both  sets  of models  were
estimated  using  the  GMM  system  estimator.  We  begin  with  the  core  specification
including  the  proxy  for  the  opportunity  costs  of investment.  Since  the  samples  are  of
modest  size,  we  first  individual  add  variables  to  the  core  specification  test  for  their
significance  and  their  impact  on  the  level  of  development  variable.  Finally,  the  last
columns  attempt,  to  the  degree  the  samples  permit,  the  inclusion  of  several  of these
variables  together.  The  increased number of instruments  leads to  a deterioration  in the
power of the Sargan tests, particularly  in the small sample.  In all  specifications, with the
exception  of  those  specifically  mentioned,  the  Sargan  and  serial  correlation  tests  are
satisfactory.
In both specifications,  column  1 shows similar estimates of the lagged  dependent
variable and level of development  which, in the former case, are reasonably robust across
specifications.  The  control  for  cyclical  influences,  the  GDP  growth  variable,  is
consistently positive and significant in the larger sample although  less consistently in the
smaller one.
The  real  interest rate has the  expected  negative  sign  in  all but one  specification
and is often although  not uniformly significant.  This intermittence is commonly  found in
the  investment  literature  (see  Serven  2003)  but  the  overall  impression  is  that  higher
borrowing costs do  lead to lower investment in R&D.  The  investment proxy offers less
intuitive  results,  entering  negatively  in  virtually  all  but  one  specification,  and  is  often
17significant.  This may suggest competition among the two types of investment for savings
as opposed  to a complementary  fixed resources.  In fact,  simple scatterplots  suggest that
while  R&D/GDP  rises  with  development,  I/GDP  follows  an  inverted  U,  perhaps
reflecting  the  diminishing  role  of  physical  capital  in  economies  more  dependent  on
innovation  for their growth.  As we will  see,  however, the variable is still picking up key
elements of the investment environment.
Private  credit  in  both  specifications  enters  with  the  predicted  positive  sign
indicating that deeper  capital  markets facilitate R&D investments.  Among the measures
of risk,  the  standard deviation  of growth  enters  with  the  expected  negative  sign  in the
interest  rate  specification  and  makes  the  interest  rate  coefficient  significant.  In. the
investment  specification,  the  risk  variable  has  the  expected  positive  sign  but  it  is  not
significant.  However,  this appears to be because the investment rate is already capturing
it.  Dropping  investment  from  the  specification  makes  macro-economic  risk  enter
significantly.  In both  specifications,  the IPR protection  index  has the  expected positive
and  very  significant  coefficient.  In  the  larger  sample,  it  causes  a  reduction  in  the
magnitude of the level of development proxy by roughly half although  no  such effect  is
found in the smaller sample.
The same is true for the proxy for the government's  ability  to mobilize  resources.
Of interest  is also that the physical investment proxy now becomes insignificant but with
the  expected  positive  sign.  The  negative  correlation  of the  two may  reflect  a reverse
causality  from  that postulated:  a  greater  government  effort  in  R&D  has  the  impact  of
crowding  out  physical  investment.  The  results  from  the  smaller sample  tell perhaps  a
different  but reasonable  story.  Once we control for the government contribution  to R&D,
the  private  component  is more  sensitive  to interest  rate  movements  than  the  aggregate
value.  Also worth noting is that a larger ability to mobilize resources  appears to account
for roughly  half of the  impact  of the GDP/capita  variable  on  R&D  effort  in  the  large
sample and a quarter in the small.
Both  measures  of complementary  research  capacity  enter  strongly  significantly
and with predicted  sign in both samples.  Of equal interest is that the introduction  of the
18quality  of research  institutions  variable eliminates  the  influence  and significance  of the
level  of development  variable  and reduces  its magnitude  and significance  in  the  large
sample.  What is  suggested  is that, of any  single variable,  the dearth of quality research
institutions  is  the  most  influential  in  explaining  why  R&D  projects  with  very  high
expected  returns  go  unexploited  in  the  developing  world.  Finally,  a  negative  and
significant  relationship  emerges  between  Leamer's  measure  of resource  abundance  and
R&D spending in both specifications.
Combining these variables  in one  specification  degrades  the  Sargan  test  in both
specifications  and  our treatment  here  is  cautious.  In  the  large  sample,  the  IP,  private
credit,  and  government  consumption  variables  maintain  their  significant  and  positive
effects.  We lose  three  countries  introducing  the  Leamer  measure,  and  the Sargan  tests
become unacceptable  (not shown)  but the previous results  are preserved  and the sign on
natural resources is again negative.  Though losing its significance  in the specification in
column  9,  the  quality  of  research  institutions  variable  also  becomes  significant  and
positive  again  in  the  reduced  sample  with  the  Leamer  measure,  but  again  with  an
excessively  high p-value for the Sargan test. More importantly,  the level of development
is not significant in any of these comprehensive specifications.
The small sample estimates  using the real interest rate  proxy are more fragile  but
we report even the specifications  with exaggerated  p-values  of Sargan  tests because they
are suggestive  and broadly  consistent with  those just discussed.  Column 9  suggests that
again, the IP index, government  spending and the quality of research  institutions measure
remain significant  and eliminate the effect of the level of development.  In the alternative
specification  in column  10, dropping  the IP index  and  including the private  credit depth
variable  causes  the  latter  to  appear  at  the  12%  significance  level,  and  the  former  to
become significant at the 10%  level.
Hence the evidence suggests that the level of development is positively correlated
with R&D effort mainly  because  rich countries  tend to have better  IP protection,  deeper
credit markets,  higher government capacity  to mobilize public R&D expenditures,  and in
all likelihood,  the better quality of the research institutions.
19The  negative  sign  on  natural  resource  abundance  merits  further  attention,
especially since the returns to R&D rise with net exports of natural resources  The most
straightforward  explanation  may  simply  be  definitional.  R&D data  "[do]  not  include
research  on  the  soils  for  agricultural  purposes,  for  oceanography  serving  the  fishing
industry,  concerning  the  economic  exploitation  of sources  of  raw  materials,  fuel  and
energy,  nor  concerning  the  use of satellite  techniques  for communication  applications"
(UNESCO  1980  p  743).  It  is not obvious  why  soil  research  or oil exploration,  which
have  very  clear  implications  for  productivity,  should  be excluded,  but  it is  likely  that
countries  specializing  in  natural  resources  will  have  uncounted  research  expenditures.
The  high  estimated  returns  to  R&D  in  natural  resource  rich  countries  may  also  be
partially  due  to  upward  bias  to  the  degree  that  research  effort  in  these  economies  is
under-estimated  by the available R&D data.
Alternatively,  perhaps  the  low  R&D  investment  in  resource  abundant  countries
occurs  because  the  rents  or market  power  associated  with  natural  resource exploitation
allow  these  economies  to perform  relatively  well  over the  medium  term  without  much
innovation  effort  (Landes  1998):  though  the  Netherlands,  Finland  and  Sweden  have
chosen  a high innovation path,  Latin America, Indonesia and Thailand are perhaps more
representative of resource rich economies that have followed  a low innovation  path.  This
is consistent with Howitt and Mayer's (2002) model of convergence  clubs and Maloney's
(2002)  application  of  it  to  explain  Latin  America's  disappointing  natural  resource
performance.
V.  Summary of Findings
This  paper  traced  the evolution  of innovation  indicators  along  the  development
process  using  international  data  on  R&D  expenditures.  The  first  part  of  the  paper
illustrated  how  R&D  expenditures  vary  with  the  level  of  development.  As  expected,
R&D effort rises with development but at an increasing rate.  In turn,  the paper examined
how  different  groups  of countries  (Latin  America,  East Asia,  and  natural-resource-rich
20countries  from  the OECD)  fare  relative  to  what  is expected  from their GDP  and  labor
force.  We found  that  Latin  America under-performs  relative  to the predictions,  but the
other country groups significantly over-perform.
Does  this mean  that these countries  over invest  in R&D? The second part of the
paper  estimated  social  rates  of  return  to  R&D  and  showed  that  the  returns  fall  with
development.  The estimated returns for all countries  are high, but our results for the U.S.
and  the  OECD  are  in  the  lower  bound  of  existing  estimates.  Future  research  could
estimate  the  extent  to  which  R&D-driven  patenting  activity  explains  the  large  returns.
Finally, the paper attempted  to explain  why rich countries  invest more in R&D than poor
countries,  given that the rates of return are higher in the latter.  We conclude that financial
depth, protection of intellectual property rights, ability to mobilize government resources,
and research institution  quality are the main reasons why  R&D effort rises with the level
of  development.  Finally,  the  returns  to  R&D  rise  net  exports  of natural  resources,
resource abundant countries in fact grow faster on average, and the application of R&D is
critical to reaping those benefits.
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27Figures 2a & b:  Residuals from R&D Benchmarking, Asia and Latin America
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28lFigures 2c & d:  Residuals from R&D Benchmarking,  Advanced Manufacturing
and Natural Resource Abundant Countries
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30TablelL. R&D and Development:  Regression Results
(1)  (2)
Dependent Variable  Log (R&D/GDP)  Log (R&D/GDP)
Estimation Method  Median  Reg.  OLS FE
Explanatory Variables:
Log GDP per capita  -1.30  -1.13
Log GDP per capita squared  0.11  0.11
Over-dispersion test (p-value)  n.a.  n.a.
Adjusted  R-squared, Log  0.32  0.37
Likelihood,  or Pseudo  R-
squared
F-test of Significance  of  n.a  0.00
Fixed-Effects  (p-value)
Observations  1386  1386
Countries  . 99
Notes: All coefficients are significant at 99%. N.a. = not applicable.
31Table 2. Returns to R&D
Dependent  Variable:Growth of GDP (Constant PPP), five year averages  1975-2000.
Methodology:  GMM System Estimator
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
Initial level of gdp per capita  0.01  ***  0.03  ***  0.00  -0.01  **  0.00  0.00  0.09  **
Investment/GDP  0.17  ***  1.30  ***  0.19  ***  0.33  ***  0.24  ***  0.27  ***  0.88  **
Labor growth  0.61  ***  0.51  ***  0.60  ***  0.50  ***  0.75  ***  0.48  ***  0.77  *
R&D/GDP  0.78  ***  3.19  ***  1.38  ***  0.52  ***  1.02  ***  9.62  ***  9.29  **
Tertiary Enrollment ratio  0.06  ***  0.03  *  0.05  **  0.02  *
NR-Leamer  0.00  **  -0.01  ***  -0  01  **
R&D*(gdp per capita)  -0.30  ***  -1.03  ***  -0 99  **
R&D*(NR-Leamer)  0.37  ***  0.33  **
InvestmentlGDP*(gdp  per capita)  -0.13  ***  -0.08  **
Sargan Test(p-value)  0.40  0.33  0.44  0.70  0.37  0.49  0.92
2nd order senal correlation  0.22  0.23  0.98  0.63  0.72  0.80  0.89
Observations  162  162  107  107  107  107  107
Countries  53  53  43  43  43  43  43
32Table 3a. Deterinants of R&D: Why Do Rich Countries Spend More?
Dependent Variable: R&D/GDP
Estimation Method:  GMM System  Estimator
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)
R&D/GDPatt-1  0.90***  0.86***  0.89***  0.87t**  0.90***  0.80***  0.87***  0.96***  0.68***  0.69***
Log(GDPpc)  0.22***  0.21***  0.22***  0.21***  0.15***  0.00  0.07*  0.18***  -0.02  0.02
GDP growth  -1.22  -0.15  -0.03  0.00  1.12***  -0.53  -0  0.09  2.68**  1.11
Real Interest Rate  -0.45  -0.23 *  -0.40 ***  -0.07  -0.86 ***  -0.04  -0.11  0.52 *  -0.15  -0.49 *
Private Credit/GDP  0.07 *  0.17
Sd Growth  -0.44 ***
Log (IP Index)  0.16***  0.39 *
Gov.Cons./GDP  0.99 ***  1.1  *  1.15*
Quality of Res. Inst.  1.22***  1.12**  0.98***
Collaboration  0.53 ***
Leamer Index  -1.38 *
Sargan Test (p-value)  0.36  0.45  0.52  0.47  0.58  0.42  0.26  0.50  0.96  0.96
2nd Order Serial  0.32  0.35  0.35  0.33  0.33  0.40  0.35  0.47
Correlation (p-value)  0.42  0.37
Observations  73  73  73  73  73  73  73  73  73  73
Countries  30  30  30  30  30  30  30  30  30  30
33Table 3b. Determinants of R&D: Why Do Rich Countries Spend More?
Dependent Variable: R&D/GDP
Estimation Method: GMM System Estimator
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)
R&D/GDP at t- 1  0.79***  0 65 ***  0.80  0.76***  0.74***  0.73***  0.83 ***  0.75 ***  0.58**
Log(GDPpc)  0.40***  0.43***  0.39***  0.23***  0.20***  0 13**  0.14***  0.46***  0.00
GDPgrowth  283**  3.51**  1.21  3.25***  2.33***  2.36**  3.50***  3.98***  4.70**
Investment/GDP  -0.72  -1.57***  -0.55  -1.13***  0.11  -0.64*  -1.25**  -0.45  -1.14**
Private Credit/GDP  0.26 ***0.44
Sd Growth  0.42
Log (IP Index)  0.29 ***  0.37
Gov.Cons./GDP  3.17 ***  3.35**
Quality of Res. Inst.  0.92
Collaboration  0.47 ***
Learner Index  -0-03
SarganTest(p-value)  0.1  0.1  0.3  0.45  0.32  0.13  0.16  0.27  0.54
2nd Order Serial  0.47  0.51  0.499  0.53  0.65  0.5  0.43  0.135  0.81
Correlation (p-value)
Observations  102  102  102  102  102  101  102  94  102
Countries  41  41  41  41  . 41  40  41  38  41
Notes: Penod dummies  were included  in all regressions.  Coefficients  are significant at *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10%.
34Annex.  Summary Statistics and List of Countries in the Various Samiples.
Table A.1 Variables used in the regressions presented in Table 1
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max
(1)
Log GDP per capita  7.77  1.53  4.41  10.94
(2)
Log GDP per capita  7.78  1.51  4.41  10.94
(3)  and (4)
Log R&D/GDP  -5.05  1.25  -13.25  -3.12
Log GDP per capita  8.51  1.47  4.68  10.75
Table A.2 Variables used in the regressions presented in Table 2
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max
Growth of GDP  0.02  0.02  -0.03  0.08
Log initial level of GDP per capita  8.89  0.84  6.50  9.95
Investment/GDP  0.23  0.05  0.11  0.41
Labor growth  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.04
R&D/GDP  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.04
Tertiary Enrollment ratio  0.33  0.19  0.02  0.92
NR-Leamer (net exports of natural  0.51  2.18  -2.52  11.11
resources per worker)
Table A.3 Variables used  in the regressions  presented  in Table 3
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max
R&D/GDP  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.04
Log GDP per capita  8.92  0.76  7.03  9.95
GDP growth  0.02  0.02  -0.04  0.08
Fixed Investment/GDP  0.23  0.05  0.13  0.41
Log IP Index  1.01  0.49  -1.11  1.58
Private Credit/GDP  0.73  0.50  0.07  2.08
Government Expenditure/GDP  0.16  0.06  0.07  0.31
Quality of Research  Institutions  1.60  0.20  1.06  1.90
Collaboration between productive  sector & universities  1.36  0.26  0.60  1.76
Learner Index  3.66  20.18  -25.23  111.13
35TABLE  A.4.  DENMARK  KYRGYZSTAN  SENEGAL
Coinplete  DOMINICAN REPL.  LATVIA  SINGAPORE
Sample  ECUADOR  LEBANON  SLOVAKIA
EGYPT  LITHUANIA  SLOVENIA
ALBANIA  EL SALVADOR  LUXEMBOURG  SOUTH AFRICA
ALGERIA  ESTONIA  MACAU  SOUTH KOREA
ARAB EMIRATES  ETHIOPIA  MADAGASCAR  SPAIN
ARGENTINA  FINLAND  MALAWI  SRI LANKA
ARMENIA  FRANCE  MALAYSIA  SURINAME
AUSTRALIA  GEORGIA  MALI  SWAZILAND
AUSTRIA  GERMANY  MALTA  SWEDEN
AZERBAIJAN  GHANA  MAURITANIA  SWITZERLAND
BAHRAIN  GREECE  MAURITIUS  SYRIA
BARBADOS  GUATEMALA  MEXICO  TAIWAN
BELARUS  GUINEA  MOROCCO  TANZANIA
BELGIUM  GUYANA  NETHERLANDS  THAILAND
BOLIVIA  HAITI  NEW GUINEA  THE BAHAMAS
BRAZIL  HONDURAS  NEW ZEALAND  TRINIDAD/TOBAGO
BRUNEI  HUNGARY  NICARAGUA  TUNISIA
BULGARIA  ICELAND  NIGERIA  TURKEY
CAMEROON  INDIA  NORWAY  UGANDA
CANADA  INDONESIA  OMAN  UKRAINE
CHAD  IRAN  PAKISTAN  UNITED KINGDOM
CHILE  IRELAND  PANAMA  URUGUAY
CHINA P.REP.  ISRAEL  PARAGUAY  UZBEKISTAN
CHINA,HONG  KONG  ITALY  PERU  VENEZUELA
S.A.R.  IVORY COAST  PHILIPPINES  VIET NAM
COLOMBIA  JAMAICA  POLAND  YEMEN
CONGO(DEM.  REP)  JAPAN  PORTUGAL  YUGOSLAVIA
COSTA RICA  JORDAN  ROMANIA  ZAMBIA
CROATIA KAZAKHSTAN  RUSSIAN  ZIMBABWE
CYPRUS  KENYA  FEDERATION





ARGENTINA*  GUATEMALA  MALTA  SPAIN*
AUSTRALIA*  HUNGARY*  MAURITIUS  SRI LANKA*
AUSTRIA*  ICELAND*  MEXICO*  SWEDEN*
BRAZIL*  INDIA*  NETHERLANDS*  SWITZERLAND*
CANADA*  INDONESIA*  NEW ZEALAND*  THAILAND*
CHILE*  IRAN  NIGERIA  TOGO*
CHINA P REP.*  IRELAND*  NORWAY*  TURKEY*
COLOMBIA  ISRAEL*  PANAMA*  U.S.A.*
COSTA RICA*  ITALIA*  PERU*  UNITED KINGDOM*
DENMARK*  JAMAICA  PHILIPPINES*  VENEZUELA
EL SALVADOR*  JAPAN*  PORTUGAL*  ZIMBABWE
FINLAND*  JORDAN  ROMANIA*
FRANCE*  MADAGASCAR*  SINGAPORE*
GREECE*  MALAYSIA*  SOUTH KOREA*
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